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The Relationship Between Fiscal Autonomy, 
Property Taxes and Student Performance Among 
South Carolina's School Districts 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This study is the result of the Education Oversight Committee's (EOC) 
desire to better understand the relationship between various characteristics of 
South Carolina school districts and the districts’ degree of fiscal autonomy.   Most 
importantly, the EOC wanted this research to focus on determining if the degree 
of fiscal autonomy impacts the level and growth of property taxes.   Secondly, the 
EOC wanted to evaluate the relationship between fiscal autonomy and the 
performance of students.     
 
The overall concern is with the costs and benefits of allowing school 
districts the power to have independent taxing authority in raising the funds 
needed to educate the students for which they are responsible. Impacts on student 
performance and tax levels are central to this discussion.  To address these issues 
for South Carolina, Miley & Associates, Inc. joined with Holley H. Ulbrich, 
Alumni Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Economics at Clemson University 
and Senior Fellow at Strom Thurmond Institute and Randolph C. Martin, 
Professor of Economics, Moore School of Business, University of South Carolina.  
 
This report presents the results of the research team’s analysis. Section II 
begins with a brief historical overview of various levels of fiscal autonomy 
existing in South Carolina. This is followed in Section III with a review of 
previous studies and recommendations from the education community. An 
overview of the degree of autonomy in other states is found in Section IV.  
Section V provides the results of statistical analysis that provide insight to the 
relationship between fiscal autonomy and student performance, per pupil costs 
and tax rates.  And finally, Section VI concludes with a summary and offers 
recommendations.  
 
 
II. OVERVIEW OF FISCAL AUTONOMY IN SOUTH CAROLINA’s 
SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
 
 The current status of fiscal autonomy in South Carolina school districts is 
perhaps the most diverse in the country.    As seen in Section IV, just about every 
state in the country except Georgia and South Carolina have uniformity with 
regards to fiscal autonomy among the districts in their respective states.  In some 
states, all of the districts are fiscally autonomous and in others, none have fiscal 
autonomy.    However, in South Carolina and Georgia there is very little 
uniformity.     
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The different degrees of fiscal autonomy in South Carolina are frequently 
grouped into three classifications. The three classes (or degrees) of fiscal 
autonomy used are; Total Independence, Limited Authority and No Authority.    
However, it would perhaps be more accurate to group them into 50 to 60 different 
classes.  There are 85 school districts in South Carolina and just about everyone is 
different in terms of their fiscal authority. 
 
As seen in Table 1, twenty-three, or a little over one-fourth of the districts 
has complete fiscal authority.   These districts have total independence in 
establishing their budgets and for setting the millage rates necessary to fund 
operational and debt service needs. 
 
There are 35 districts that have limited authority.   However, these  
districts are not uniform in their autonomy status.   For example, three require 
County Council approval to implement millage increases above a certain level, 
but each is implemented differently.       One district requires legislative approval 
to exceed a certain limit.   One requires a special ordinance to be passed.    The 
rest have to have county council approval for various levels of millage increases.  
Of these 35, there are five districts that have a statutory cap and require county 
council approval to exceed that cap.     Some require a local referendum or 
legislative approval to exceed the cap.  
 
Finally, there are 27 districts that have no authority.   However, again 
there is no uniformity in the implementation of their respective autonomy.  For 
example, three districts require legislative approval for their budget.   Five 
districts require a Town meeting for their budget approval.    The rest of these 
districts must have their county council approve their budget.  
 
The current status of the organizational structure and fiscal autonomy of 
South Carolina's public school districts is the result of a continuous evolution ever 
since the colonial period of the 18th Century.1   Prior to 1868, the only effort in 
South Carolina to create a modern school system for the masses took place in 
Charleston.   The new constitution of 1868 created the State Department of 
Education and divided each county into school districts and established a system 
of free common schools for all children without reference to wealth or race.    The 
1868 constitution levied a poll tax on all taxable property to support education. 
Thirty years later, the 1895 constitution empowered school districts to levy 
property taxes.   This document also led to establishing boards of trustees in the 
counties and districts for the specific purpose of governing schools. 
                                                          
1.  This brief summary of the evolution of the school system is drawn from Jean C. Allen’s “Fifty 
Years of Leadership for South Carolina School Boards:1950 – 2000, published by the South 
Carolina School Boards Association, February 2000.   For a more thorough history of the 
evolution of the state’s public education system see her work. 
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Table 1 
 
Fiscal Authority of South Carolina School Boards 
 
 
 
 
Total independence 23 districts 
 
Aiken   Edgefield 
Berkeley  Georgetown 
Charleston  Lexington 1-5 
Cherokee  Marlboro 
Chester  Spartanburg 1-7 
Darlington  Union 
 
 
 
Limited Authority 31 districts 
 
County Council approval to exceed this limit 
Dorchester 2 & 4 -- EIA local effort 
Fairfield -- 3% above previous year’s budget or CPI whichever is lower 
Newberry -- 4 mills 
Legislative delegation approval to exceed this limit 
Chesterfield -- 8% 
Special law to exceed this limit 
Williamsburg -- 3 mills 
County board has authority to increase millage to exceed this limit 
Anderson 1-5 -- 10 mills once in three year period 
Marion 1-4 -- (appointed) Up to annual EFA inflation factor 
Orangeburg 3, 4, 5 -- 3 mills over EFA inflation factor 
 
Referendum to exceed this limit 
 
Allendale   Inflation +4 mills 
Bamberg 1-2   3 mills 
Barnwell 19, 29, 45  10 mills 
Greenville   4 mills/formula 
Lancaster   5 mills 
Pickens   Formula 
York 1-4   6 mills 
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Table 1 (Cont.) 
 
Fiscal Authority of South Carolina School Boards 
 
 
 
Statutory cap  5 districts 
 
Requires county council approval to exceed 
Abbeville -- Same millage 
Kershaw -- Limit 74 mills 
Requires referendum to exceed 
Florence 1 -- Same millage 
Requires legislative delegation approval to exceed 
Laurens 55, 56 -- 7 mills + EFA inflation factor, not to exceed 10 mills 
 
 
No authority  27 districts 
 
Legislative delegation approves budget 
Dillon 1-3 -- (appointed) 
Town meetings required to approve budget 
Florence 2-5 
County council approves budget 
 
Beaufort   Jasper 
Calhoun   Lee 
Clarendon 1 & 3  McCormick 
Clarendon 2 (Appointed) Oconee 
Colleton   Richland 1 & 2 
Greenwood 50,51,52  Saluda 
Hampton 1 & 2  Sumter 2, 17 
 
 
 
 
Source:  South Carolina School Boards Association 
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In many instances, every school was a school district.   For example, in 
1951, there were over 1,700 school districts in South Carolina.   In July 1951, 
Governor James F. Byrnes orchestrated a massive consolidation reducing the 
number of school districts down to 100.   Since that time, there has been 
continuous consolidation that has resulted in the 85 districts that exist today.  
 
The variety of financing arrangements currently existing for the state’s 
school districts has resulted from this consolidation process and the lack of 
overriding policies dealing with such issues.  Local preferences and politics have 
led to the differences currently observed.  The following section reviews the 
findings of several studies, which examine the issue of fiscal autonomy from a 
South Carolina perspective. 
 
 
 
III OTHER RESEARCH EFFORTS 
 
 
There have been three relatively recent studies, which to varying degrees 
examine the issue of allowing fiscal autonomy for local school boards in South 
Carolina.  The first of these is the Recommendations to the South Carolina 
Education Oversight Committee  (EOC) by the Study Team on Local Leadership 
Quality and Engagement (October 19, 2000).  The second report is titled A Five-
Year Comparison of South Carolina School Districts with Varying Degrees of 
Fiscal Authority. This was published in November of 1996 by the South Carolina 
School Boards Association (SCSBA) and was written by Elizabeth Warren.  The 
third document is The Local Government Funding System, a report from the 
Technical Work Group to the Local Government Funding System Steering 
Committee.  Released in September of 1999, this document provides a 
comprehensive set of findings and recommendation for improving the local 
government funding system in South Carolina. What follows is a critical review 
and summary of these three documents. 
 
The first two of these reports were prepared by or for groups who are 
vocal supporters of fiscal authority for all South Carolina school districts (EOC 
and SCSBA).  It is not surprising then that these documents provide arguments 
and data in support of such autonomy.  The last report, however, is not associated 
with any pro-autonomy group yet provides a well-reasoned case for change in the 
way in which the fiscal decisions of our school districts are determined.   This 
later document also provides input from those who oppose such fiscal autonomy.  
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1. The Education Oversight Committee Report 
 
The EOC report is the product of the efforts of a study team chaired by 
Don Herriot, CEO of Roche Carolina and made up of business leaders, school 
board member and educators from around the state. The focus of the report is on 
the overall governance of South Carolina public schools. Utilizing a "best 
practices" approach, the study team concludes that "our state's educational 
governance structure can be described, at best, as a patchwork quilt and, at worst, 
as a fragmented system which some excel despite the environment, most struggle 
through it, and few are aided by it."2  It is within this context that the report calls 
for a uniform policy of fiscal autonomy for funding the local share of public 
school financing in South Carolina. 
 
At the time this work was done, twenty-two of the state's eighty-six school 
districts had total independence in all fiscal matters; thirty-one had limited 
authority (e.g. district may raise millage rates with the approval of a county 
council); six districts were required to operate within a statutory cap on millage; 
and twenty-seven districts had no fiscal authority.  The fragmentation of funding 
procedures is thus obvious. 
 
Problems confronting those districts without authority to draw upon the 
local revenue base are discussed.  These are: 
 
* "Districts without fiscal autonomy are unable to plan beyond the 
current operational year; without long-term control of resources, 
boards of trustees and administrators cannot implement the 
changes necessary to alter performance." 
 
* "Districts with millage caps experience erosion of base funding 
over time when the value of the mill does not keep pace either will 
inflation or with state requirements for matched cost." 
 
* "Districts with millage caps tend to budget to the cap each year; 
districts that must appeal to another body frequently ask for higher 
millage because the anticipate not receiving their full request."3 
 
* “Districts without autonomy can become at risk for failing to 
maintain the EIA-required local effort and thus face mandated 
penalties (e.g., loss of state support).  However, the State Board of 
Education has consistently waived such penalties for districts that 
have failed to maintain local effort”. 
 
 
                                                          
2.Recommendations to the South Carolina Educational Oversight Committee, Study Team,  
October 19, 2000, page 2 
3 These quotes are found on page 13 of the EOC document. 
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The EOC study team also reported that they examined fourteen years of  
actions on millage rates.  While none of the data is presented, the claim is that 
"millage rates in fiscally autonomous school districts have risen less and at a 
slower pace than millage rates in school districts with limited, capped or no 
autonomy."4  The implication is that autonomy does not necessarily lead to 
excessive increases in a districts millage rates for school funding. Since the 
revenues generated by a mill can vary significantly from district to district, this 
observation may be the result of autonomous districts also being districts with 
larger tax bases.5 
 
Finally, the report recommends various requirements for local school 
boards and their members to assure that such bodies are competent and sensitive 
to the desires of local citizens.  These include: 
 
* The election of all school boards in the state;  
* Members must have a high school diploma or a GED;  
 * New member orientation is required with a statutory penalty for 
non-compliance;  
 * Continuing education for members is required and funded by the 
state;  
 * Board members and superintendents of districts rated as 
"unsatisfactory" should engage in a training program to focus on 
roles and actions in support of increasing student performance.   
 
The thrust of these recommendations is that along with the authority to tax 
the local property base must come the skills and competencies to make such 
decisions in a manner, which is in the best interests of the district's students and 
citizens. 
 
 
2. South Carolina School Boards Association Study 
 
 
The second study to be reviewed comes from the South Carolina School 
Boards Association. It focuses directly on the issues of fiscal autonomy of local 
school districts and provides numerical information in support of granting such 
authority to all districts.  Specifically, the study compares data over a five-year 
period for three groupings of school districts: those with complete fiscal 
autonomy; those with limited autonomy; and those with no authority at all.  The 
period covered is 1990-91 to 1994-95 and variables compared include Average 
Daily Membership (enrollment), Taxes for current operations from local sources; 
Operating mills; Debt service and capital expenditure mills; and operating 
expenditures per pupil in average daily expenditures (money from all sources). 
 
                                                          
4 Also from page 13. 
5 This possibility will be examined in another section of this report. 
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By making various comparisons of this data for the three groups of South 
Carolina school districts, the report concludes that all districts should be granted 
complete autonomy.  Specifically, it is stated  "districts with total fiscal autonomy 
experience student growth but remained fiscally conservative in operating millage 
and debt service millage.  Elected school board members are the representatives 
closest to the communities.  They should have the authority over the district 
budget and should be able to raise millage if necessary to meet legal requirements, 
student growth requirements and the wishes of their local communities.  The data 
support the conclusion that fiscally autonomous school boards take their 
responsibility seriously."6 
 
While indeed the data appear to support the contention that autonomous 
school districts do not operate with complete disregard for fiscal issues, the 
conclusion is a limited one.  The study itself points out that no tests have been 
made to determine whether or not the noted differences are statistically significant 
and that the revenues generated by a mill of taxes can and do differ greatly 
between property-rich and property- poor districts.  Also, it says nothing about the 
differing student performance between these groups of districts and the much 
more difficult question of whether any positive difference can be traced to the 
presence of autonomy.  A definitive answer to this last question may be beyond 
the scope of this study given the data limitations and the complexity of the many 
factors influencing student performance. 
 
3. Local Government Funding System Study 
 
The final report to be considered provides a rather extensive set of 
recommendations covering the entire scope of local government financing.  This 
material reflects the findings of a series of working papers and subsequent 
deliberations of a Technical Work Group established by the state legislature.  The 
goal of this effort was to  improve the funding system for local governments in 
South Carolina. Recommendations are based on a set of six guiding "criteria" set 
out by the Steering Committee as to their view of a "desirable" local funding 
system.  These six criteria are (1) Stability (policy and revenue stability); (2) 
Balance and diversity; (3) Equity (horizontal, vertical, and interjurisdictional 
equity); (4) Accountability; (5) Adequacy (or sufficiency); and (6) Ease 
(efficiency) of administration and compliance. Recommended changes in the local 
funding system are then based on these six criteria.  Further, the changes are 
supposed to be revenue neutral in their impact.7 
 
Recommendation #7 in this report is that school districts in South Carolina 
be given fiscal autonomy.  The report recognizes that most school board members 
are elected by and accountable to citizens just as members of city and county 
councils are.  They are also under considerable pressure to improve the quality of 
                                                          
6 A Five-Year Comparison of South Carolina School Districts With Varying Degrees of Fiscal 
Authority, South Carolina School Boards Association, November 1, 1996, page 6. 
7 See pages 2-5 of the report. 
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education being delivered with various mandates from both state and federal 
governments.  At the same time, they do not receive sufficient funding from these 
governments to deliver on the mandates.  Thus, while decisions may be made at 
different levels of governments requiring additional local revenue, the ability of 
local districts to respond varies greatly according to their degree of fiscal 
autonomy. Thus follows the recommendation that "all elected school boards be 
granted the power to determine their own budgets and establish their own mill 
rates for school purposes".8   
 
The autonomy recommendation is based on the criterion of 
"accountability" which is number (4) above.  While having several components, 
this concept simply states the "government" that spends the money should have 
some degree of responsibility for collecting it, so that taxpayers can see the 
connection between taxes paid and services received.  In this case one reads 
school district for government in the prior sentence.  The study also recommends 
expansion of local revenue sources for schools (#26) plus a number of other 
recommendations, which would have impacts on school financing in South 
Carolina. 
 
Finally, the discussion of fiscal autonomy for school districts in this report 
ends with a presentation of the objections and reservations that exist concerning 
this particular recommendation.  It is noted that both the business community and 
the County Association are concerned because schools would share the same base 
as counties and municipalities.  Concern is thus over the impact on total mill rates.  
A rather strong objection is also noted in a quote from the S.C. Chamber of 
Commerce, which calls for the need for some "final review of tax increases by a 
body with broader authority (i.e. county council or legislative delegation) to 
ensure a check and balance of tax increases."9 
 
4. Conclusions from other research 
 
This concludes the review of the three studies noted in the opening 
paragraph.  Each offers support for granting fiscal autonomy to local school 
districts.  The first two deal only with the subject of fiscal autonomy while the last 
study does so in a broader context of the entire local financing structure in South 
Carolina. Finally, only the last study mentions the arguments against such a policy 
change or outlines the concerns of those apposed to statewide autonomy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 See page 20 of the report. 
9 See page 20 of the report. 
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IV.  FISCAL AUTONOMY IN OTHER STATES10 
 
A 1997 report by the Education Commission of the States Information 
Clearinghouse (ECS) describes the status of the nation’s school boards in 1991 in 
terms of elected versus appointed and with or without taxing authority.11 In 1991, 
there were 15,437 school boards in the nation, ranging from one in Hawaii to 
1,052 in Texas.  The vast majority, 14,995 (97%) were elected.  The report did not 
make the finer distinction between full, partial, and no fiscal autonomy, and 
focused solely on taxing authority rather than including the budget approval 
processes.  Districts with either limited or full taxing authority were classified as 
“independent,” while those with no taxing authority were classified as 
“dependent.”   
 
Nationwide, 11,869 school boards, or 77% of the total, had some degree of 
fiscal autonomy in 1991. Thirty states give all their school boards some measure 
of fiscal autonomy (33 including Pennsylvania, which has 500 boards with fiscal 
autonomy and only one without; New York, 686 and 5; and Arizona, which has 
222 independent boards and only 4 classed as fiscally dependent).  Twelve states 
give none of their school boards fiscal autonomy (14 including North Carolina 
and New Hampshire; only 2 of the 118 districts in North Carolina and one of the 
175 in New Hampshire have taxing authority). Hawaii has a single state school 
board.  That leaves only two states, Georgia and South Carolina, with a significant 
mixture of school boards with and without fiscal autonomy.  In 1991, South 
Carolina was classified as having 28 districts that were fiscally dependent (no 
taxing authority) and 63 fiscally independent, including those we would 
categorize as possessing limited fiscal autonomy. In Georgia, the mix was 23 
dependent and 159 independent. 
 
Among Southern states there is a greater tendency to make school boards 
fiscally dependent, without taxing authority.  Table 2 summarizes the status of 
school boards in ten Southern states in 1991. 
 
There is no clear Southern pattern on this governance issue. Among our 
neighboring states, four—Florida, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas—grant all their 
school boards some degree of fiscal autonomy, while another four (with a minor 
exception in North Carolina) grant it to none.  Georgia and South Carolina are 
alone both in the South and in the nation as a whole in having a mixed system. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Additional detail on the fiscal autonomy in other states is provided in Appendix A. 
11 “Fiscally Dependent/Independent School Districts,” Education Commission of the States 
Information Clearing House, 1997.  An updated report will be available in late 2001, but these are 
the most recent available compilations on this issue. 
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Table 2 
Fiscal Independence of School Districts in Southern States, 1991 
 
 
State   # Fiscally    %  # Fiscally   % 
  Dependent       Independent                   
 
Alabama   127 100%   0  0% 
Arkansas       0     0%          315         100% 
Florida        0     0%            67         100% 
Georgia     23   13%          159           87% 
Louisiana       0     0%            66         100% 
Mississippi              149 100%   0  0% 
North Carolina  118   98%   2  2% 
South Carolina    28   31%            63            69% 
Tennessee              139 100%   0  0% 
Texas        0     0%       1,052         100% 
Virginia              137 100%                         0  0% 
 
 
There are two conclusions that might be drawn from this national pattern: 
 
o Nationally, most states are uniform or almost uniform.  They either give 
school boards taxing authority or they do not.  The clear advantage of 
some degree of uniformity is that local school boards will meet changes 
in state regulations, requirements, and/or funding with similar options for 
how to respond.  In states with mixed systems, the ability of local boards 
to adjust to a change at the state level varies from one district to another 
because of differences in the degree of autonomy. 
 
o More than ¾ of all school boards nationwide have some degree of fiscal 
autonomy—a slightly higher proportion than in South Carolina, a little 
lower than Georgia.  This preference for autonomy is buttressed by a 
more recent ECS report, described below. 
 
In November 1999, the ECS issued a report titled “Governing America’s 
Schools: Changing the Rules.” This report recommended two alternative 
structures, one in which schools would be publicly funded and publicly operated, 
the other in which they would be publicly funded and independently operated, 
which is akin to a voucher system.  The latter alternative lies outside the scope of 
this report.  Within the first option, however, the Commission strongly 
recommends that school districts, in order to be both empowered and accountable, 
be given the authority to develop and adopt their own budgets, which implies 
taxing authority as well.  Thus, they endorse the majority pattern of existing 
school boards with at least some degree of fiscal autonomy.  They also strongly 
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encourage granting more power and authority to the individual school than exists 
at present in most systems, with appropriate accountability measures. 
 
  
 
V. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
 
In order to determine whether fiscal autonomy affects tax rates, revenues 
or student performance, we conducted two types of statistical analysis.  The first 
is descriptive statistics for each of the three categories of school districts, looking 
at means and ranges of values for various socioeconomic, fiscal and performance 
variables.  The second type is regression analysis.  Results of both methods are 
reported in this section. 
 
1. A portrait of school districts: who has autonomy? 
 
If we think of fiscal autonomy along county lines (since in most cases, all 
districts within a county have the same degree of fiscal autonomy), the state is 
divided into roughly 30% each with full or no autonomy and 40% with limited 
authority.  Although there are 23 districts with fiscal autonomy, they represent 
only 13 counties. In general, districts with full autonomy are larger, more urban, 
whiter, and more prosperous than districts with limited or no autonomy.  
However, a few of these districts are relatively poor and rural with large minority 
populations—Edgefield, Marlboro, Union and Chester, all with a single 
countywide school district.  
 
In contrast, the 26 districts in 14 counties with no autonomy, there is a real 
mixture.  Seven of these districts are in four relatively prosperous, urban or 
suburban counties (Richland, Greenwood, Oconee, and Beaufort).  Four are in 
Florence County and two in Sumter County, which are relatively urban but have 
higher than average minority populations.  The remaining 11 districts are all in the 
lowcountry, and are generally poor, rural, and heavily minority. 
 
In between are the other 38 districts in 19 counties (including one of the 
Florence districts) with varying degrees of limited autonomy.  Greenville, the 
largest district in the state, tends to dominate the statistics in this category.  
Anderson, York, Pickens and Orangeburg are also relatively large urban/suburban 
counties, accounting for another 13 districts.  This category also includes a 
number of smaller, more rural, predominantly minority counties—Marion, 
Barnwell, Bamberg, McCormick, Allendale, Laurens, Fairfield, Abbeville, 
Newberry, Williamsburg and Chesterfield. Socioeconomic characteristics for 
each of the three classes are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3 
Socioeconomic Characteristics by Autonomy Class 
 
          Full autonomy       Limited autonomy       No autonomy 
Variable   Mean  Range      Mean    Range      Mean  Range                    
1997 county      
Population      166,037   19,750-200,370     85,055    9,530-348,520        76,992   13,770-303,580 
 
Percent minority  26%  11-47%       39%  9-68%               43%       9-63% 
 
1996 Per Capita 
Income (county)       $19,406    $13,891-$22,812    $18,312    $13,269-$24,058   $17,662  $12,331-$22,891    
 
% county population 
 w/BA degree           14.1%     7.2-21.0%         13.5%       7.1-21.0%                 16.8%    4.8-28.0% 
 
Number of pupils     11,074      2,331-43,565     6,934      481-56,664               5,392    964-27,058 
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2. Fiscal characteristics 
 
Does fiscal autonomy affect mill rates, mill rate growth, local and total 
revenue per pupil?  Do districts with fiscal autonomy have greater wealth per 
pupil than districts without?  Do they get more or less state aid? To answer those 
questions, we turn to the fiscal statistics.  Table 4 summarizes the fiscal 
characteristics of the three groups of districts.  In general, the average mill rate is 
highest in districts with full autonomy, but not by much—an average of 163 mills 
compared to 157 in districts with partial autonomy and 143 mills in districts with 
no autonomy.  For just operating millage, the difference is even smaller—139 
mills compared to 130 and 125, respectively. Growth in millage from 1987 to 
1997 has been about the same for districts with full and limited autonomy, 49 
mills versus 48 mills, but less in those districts with no autonomy (34 mills).  
 
Districts with full autonomy raised more local revenue per pupil on 
average ($2,179) in 1997 than those with partial autonomy ($1,982) or no 
autonomy ($1,720), partly because of higher average millage but also because of 
higher assessed valuation per pupil ($14,080 compared to $12,142 and $11,832) 
and lower state aid per pupil ($2,976, compared to $3,206 and $3,962 in the other 
two groups).  Although there was a wide range in each class as a result of the 
offsetting effects of millage, property tax base, and state aid, the difference in 
total revenue per pupil( a rough measure of education spending) is almost 
nonexistent.  The full autonomy group spent $5,372 per pupil in 1997, compared 
to a larger sum in the limited autonomy ($5,489) and no autonomy ($5,380) 
districts. 
 
 
3. Are the outcomes different? 
 
The final question is whether the outcomes are different among the three 
classes of districts.  Given the limited variation in per pupil spending, there is no 
reason to expect different outcomes by autonomy class, except to the extent that 
the mix of districts in terms of social and economic characteristics varies from 
class to class.  There is a smaller percentage of students scoring low on both parts 
of the BSAP in full autonomy districts than the other two, higher SAT scores in 
1999, and a higher percentage passing the exit exam than in the other two groups 
of districts. Readiness scores were highest in the limited autonomy districts.  
Performance measures are summarized in Table 5. 
 
While the low autonomy districts have the poorest performance, given the 
limited range of variation in spending per pupil, it is more likely to reflect the 
socioeconomic characteristics than the fiscal behavior of the school districts in 
that group. In order to analyze these relationships more thoroughly, we turn to the 
regression results. 
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Table 4 
Fiscal Characteristics by Autonomy Class, 1997 
 
         Full autonomy         Limited autonomy         No autonomy 
Variable  Mean  Range   Mean    Range      Mean  Range 
 
Total millage           163.3    105.2-217.3       157.1     105-239                  142.6    82.1-261 
 
Operating millage   139.1     84.8-215              130.3      89.7-208                 125.1    73.4-243 
 
Assessed valuation 
  Per pupil            $14,080    $5,732-27,096    $12,142   $6,141-29,148    $11,832   $4,938-32,308 
 
Local revenue per 
   Pupil                   $2,179   $1,257-3,368      $1,982     $1,242-$5,390     $1,720    $944-3,352 
 
State revenue per 
   Pupil                  $2,976    $2,520-3,465        $2,975     $1,178-3,465       $3,062   $2,135-3,542 
 
Total revenue per  
   Pupil        $5,372    $4,579-6,227        $5,476    $4,617-7,547        $5,380     $4,625-6,536 
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Table 5 
Performance Characteristics by Autonomy Class 
 
       Full autonomy       Limited autonomy       No autonomy 
Variable  Mean  Range  Mean    Range      Mean  Range 
 
Average SAT 99 945    885-1043        928       731-1031                   890       750-1018 
 
Score below average 
Both parts of BSAP 
1997   16.9%   5.4-33.9%         22.7%    6.4-45.3%               24.3%    9-47.3% 
 
Percent passing  
Exit exam, 1999         62.4%    49.9-80.1%       59.7%    34.1-79.9%             56.3%    42.9-82.1% 
 
Readiness for school  
1997                            80.2%    73-92%            83.9%     73-94.9%                 76.2%    59.6-90.4% 
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4. Regression results 
 
Three sets of regressions were run.  The first set of regressions used a 
dummy variable for fiscal autonomy of 1,2, or 3 as full, partial, or no autonomy, 
as defined by the state Department of Education.  The second set of regressions 
grouped the districts according to full or partial autonomy compared to no 
autonomy.  The third set of regressions grouped the districts as full autonomy 
compared to limited autonomy.  Each set of regressions then attempted to 
determine the effect of fiscal autonomy on various fiscal variables and various 
measures of student performance, taking into account such socio-demographic 
variables as income, minority population, average level of education, average 
school size, and assessed value per pupil. 
 
The fiscal variables were total school millage (TMILLS), change in 
millage from 1987 to 1997 (DMILLS), local revenue per pupil (LREV), and total 
revenue per pupil (TREV), which is a rough approximation to per pupil spending.  
In the case of DMILLS, some of the explanatory variables were also measured as 
changes between 1987 and 1997—change in income, change in number of pupils, 
and changes in assessed value per pupil. 
 
The performance variables were percentage scoring below average in both 
parts of the BSAP, percent failing the exit exam (EXIT99), and 1999 SAT scores 
(SAT99). 
 
 
Results for fiscal variables with three classes of autonomy.  
 
There was a highly significant relationship between fiscal autonomy and 
both the mill rate and the change in the mill rate.  Average millage declined about 
15 mills with declining measures of fiscal autonomy, and millage growth over the 
ten-year period was about 13 mills less for each degree of autonomy.  Total 
millage was negatively related to assessed value per pupil (AVP), but the 
coefficient was quite small. Growth in millage was also related to average size of 
school (SIZE), declining with larger school plants, which is probably a rural 
effect, but the coefficient was very small.  There was also a positive but weak and 
small relationship between millage growth and percent minority population 
(MINOR). 
 
When it came to local revenue per pupil, however, the effect of fiscal 
autonomy was of very limited significance.  1996 per capita income and assessed 
value per pupil were all highly significant but the actual dollar effects were small 
in both cases.  There was also some borderline effect of average school size, with 
slightly higher local revenue per pupil in districts with smaller schools. 
 
Total revenue per pupil was strongly related to AVP, suggesting that state 
equalization efforts do not adequately overcome the effects of the wealth of the 
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district.  Minority population and school size were also highly significant in 
explaining differences in total revenue per pupil, although the actual dollar 
differences resulting from these two effects was small.  Interestingly, fiscal 
autonomy was of borderline significance in these equations. 
 
 
Performance results with three classes of autonomy.  
 
 
Three measures of student performance were used: SAT99, EXIT99 
(percent failing the exit exam), and BSAP (percent with low BSAP scores on both 
parts).  Explanatory variables were total revenue per pupil as a measure of 
spending, fiscal autonomy, percent minority, 1996 per capita income, assessed 
valuation per pupil, level of education in the adult population, average school 
size, and scores on readiness tests in 1997, a measure of the ability of entering 
students. 
 
For both SAT99 and EXIT99, the only significant variable was the 
minority percentage of the population, with a small but decidedly negative effect 
in both cases.  Total revenue per pupil as a proxy for spending does not appear to 
affect these outcomes, nor does fiscal autonomy.  For BSAP, both the minority 
percentage and the readiness of entering students were quite significant, as well as 
per capita income and average level of education in the population.  Clearly, 
socioeconomic factors play a significant role in all of these results.  
 
The performance variables were percentage scoring below average in both 
parts of the BSAP, percent failing the exit exam (EXIT99), and 1999 SAT scores 
(SAT99). 
 
 
Results for fiscal variables with two classes of autonomy, some or none.   
 
The second set of regressions combined districts with full autonomy and 
districts with limited autonomy to compare the results for districts with no 
autonomy. This is the classification system used by the Education Commission of 
the States, which calls the first two groups fiscally independent and the latter 
group fiscally dependent. 
 
Once again, there was a highly significant relationship between fiscal 
autonomy and both the mill rate and the change in the mill rate.  Average millage 
was about 10 mills lower in districts with no fiscal autonomy, holding other 
factors constant, and millage growth over the ten-year period was about 10 mills 
less.  Total millage showed a weak negative relationship to assessed value per 
pupil (AVP), but the coefficient was quite small. Growth in millage was also 
related to average size of school (SIZE), declining with larger school plants, 
which is probably a rural effect, but the coefficient was very small. 
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When it came to local revenue per pupil, however, the effect of fiscal 
autonomy was of only marginal significance.  1996 per capita income and 
assessed value per pupil were both quite significant but the actual dollar effects 
were small in both cases.  There was also some borderline effect of average 
school size, with slightly higher local revenue per pupil in districts with smaller 
schools. 
 
As in the previous case, total revenue per pupil was strongly related to 
AVP, suggesting that state equalization efforts do not adequately overcome the 
effects of the wealth of the district.  Minority population and school size were also 
highly significant in explaining differences in total revenue per pupil, although the 
actual dollar differences resulting from these two effects was small.  Fiscal 
autonomy showed no significance in these equations. 
 
 
Performance results with two classes of autonomy, some or none 
 
Three measures of student performance were used: SAT99, EXIT99 
(percent failing the exit exam), and BSAP (percent with low BSAP scores on both 
parts).  Explanatory variables were total revenue per pupil as a measure of 
spending, fiscal autonomy, percent minority, 1996 per capita income, assessed 
valuation per pupil, level of education in the adult population, average school 
size, and scores on readiness tests in 1997, a measure of the ability of entering 
students. 
 
As in the previous case, for both SAT99 and EXIT99, the only significant 
variable was the minority percentage of the population, with a small but decidedly 
negative effect in both cases.  Total revenue per pupil as a proxy for spending 
does not appear to affect these outcomes.  For BSAP, both the minority 
percentage and the readiness of entering students were quite significant, as well as 
per capita income and average level of education in the population.  Fiscal 
autonomy was not significant for any of these performance results. 
 
 
Results for fiscal variables with two classes of autonomy (full or less than  
full).   
 
The third set of regressions compared districts with full autonomy to 
districts with limited autonomy and districts with no autonomy.  The third set of 
regressions were run in order to isolate the effects of full autonomy compared to 
districts which are subject to at least some degree of constraint. 
 
Once again, there was a highly significant relationship between fiscal 
autonomy and the mill rate.  Average millage was about 10 mills lower in districts 
with less or no fiscal autonomy, holding other factors constant.  However, unlike 
the previous cases, full autonomy did not result in higher millage growth 
compared to districts with less autonomy.  Total millage showed a negative 
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relationship to assessed value per pupil (AVP), but the coefficient was quite 
small. None of the explanatory variables had any impact on the growth in the mill 
rate. 
 
Full fiscal autonomy also had no explanatory power for either local or 
total revenue per pupil. 1996 per capita income and assessed value per pupil were 
both quite significant but the actual dollar effects were small in both cases.  There 
was also some effect of average school size, with slightly higher local revenue 
and slightly lower total revenue per pupil in districts with smaller schools.  
Minority population was not significant for local revenue per pupil, but was 
significantly and positively related to total revenue per pupil, suggesting that these 
districts get more state aid. 
 
Performance results with two classes of autonomy (full or less than full).  
 
The same three measures of student performance were used: SAT99, 
EXIT99 (percent failing the exit exam), and BSAP (percent with low BSAP 
scores on both parts).  Explanatory variables were total revenue per pupil as a 
measure of spending, fiscal autonomy, percent minority, 1996 per capita income, 
assessed valuation per pupil, level of education in the adult population, average 
school size, and scores on readiness tests in 1997, a measure of the ability of 
entering students. 
 
As in the previous case, for both SAT99 and EXIT99, the only significant 
variable was the minority percentage of the population, with a small but decidedly 
negative effect in both cases.  Total revenue per pupil as a proxy for spending 
does not appear to affect these outcomes, nor does fiscal autonomy.  For BSAP, 
both the minority percentage and the readiness of entering students were quite 
significant, as well as per capita income and average level of education in the 
population.   
 
 
Performance results with two classes of autonomy (some or none) 
 
Three measures of student performance were used: SAT99, EXIT99 
(percent failing the exit exam), and BSAP (percent with low BSAP scores on both 
parts).  Explanatory variables were total revenue per pupil as a measure of 
spending, fiscal autonomy, percent minority, 1996 per capita income, assessed 
valuation per pupil, level of education in the adult population, average school 
size, and scores on readiness tests in 1997, a measure of the ability of entering 
students. 
 
As in the previous case, for both SAT99 and EXIT99, the only significant 
variable was the minority percentage of the population, with a small but decidedly 
negative effect in both cases.  Total revenue per pupil as a proxy for spending 
does not appear to affect these outcomes, nor does fiscal autonomy.  For BSAP, 
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both the minority percentage and the readiness of entering students were quite 
significant, as well as per capita income and average level of education in the 
population.  Again, socio-demographic factors seem to be very significantly 
related to outcomes or student performance at the end of the educational process. 
 
Conclusions from the regressions 
 
There does seem to be some relationship between fiscal autonomy and tax 
rates, but it is neither strong in terms of statistical significance nor large in terms 
of total millage.  Interestingly, when districts are grouped so that districts with full 
autonomy are compared with all other districts, the millage difference remains but 
the effect on the increase in millage disappears.  Districts with full autonomy have 
not been exercising that autonomy to increase mill rates faster than other districts 
in the last decade.   
 
Once we move away from millage to other measures of school revenue 
and spending, such as local revenue per pupil or total revenue per pupil, fiscal 
autonomy becomes a relatively insignificant factor in explaining differences 
between districts.  Moving still farther from spending to performance, we could 
not detect any difference between student performance in districts with full, 
limited, or no fiscal autonomy; socio-demographic factors were of overwhelming 
significance in all cases. 
 
 
VI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The current status of fiscal autonomy in South Carolina school districts is 
perhaps the most diverse and complicated in the country.  There are three levels 
(or degrees) of fiscal autonomy typically used to classify these districts; Total 
Independence, Limited Authority and No Authority.    However, it would be more 
accurate to group them into 50 to 60 different classes.  There are 85 school 
districts in South Carolina and just about every one is different in terms of their 
degree of fiscal autonomy.     
 
Twenty-three, or a little over one-fourth of the districts has complete fiscal 
authority.  There are 35 districts that have limited authority (five districts have a 
statutory cap and require county council approval to exceed that cap).   The 
remaining 27 districts have no authority. 
 
There have been three relatively recent studies, which to varying degrees 
examine the issue of allowing fiscal autonomy for local school boards in South 
Carolina.  The first of these is the Recommendations to the South Carolina 
Education Oversight Committee  (EOC) by the Study Team on Local Leadership 
Quality and Engagement (October 19, 2000).  The second report is titled A Five-
Year Comparison of South Carolina School Districts with Varying Degrees of 
Fiscal Authority. This was published in November of 1996 by the South Carolina 
School Boards Association (SCSBA) and was written by Elizabeth Warren.  The 
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third document is The Local Government Funding System, a report from the 
Technical Work Group to the Local Government Funding System Steering 
Committee.   
 
Each of these studies offers support for granting fiscal autonomy to local 
school districts.  The first two deal only with the subject of fiscal autonomy while 
the last study does so in a broader context of the entire local financing structure in 
South Carolina. Finally, only the last study mentions the arguments against such a 
policy change or outlines the concerns that may exist concerning this issue. 
 
Nationally, most states are uniform or almost uniform.  They either give 
school boards taxing authority or they do not. Only two states in the country, 
Georgia and South Carolina, have a significant mixture of school boards with and 
without fiscal autonomy. The clear advantage of some degree of uniformity is that 
local school boards will meet changes in state regulations, requirements, and/or 
funding with similar options for how to respond.  In states with mixed systems, 
the ability of local boards to adjust to state mandated changes differ from one 
district to another because of differences in the degree of autonomy.  More than ¾ 
of all school boards nationwide have some degree of fiscal autonomy—a slightly 
higher proportion than in South Carolina, a little lower than Georgia. 
 
In its November 1999, report titled “Governing America’s Schools: 
Changing the Rules.”  The Commission of the States Information Clearinghouse 
(ECS) strongly recommends that school districts, in order to be both empowered 
and accountable, be given the authority to develop and adopt their own budgets, 
which implies taxing authority as well. 
 
There are a number of options that could be explored with respect to fiscal 
autonomy.  One issue that emerges from the report of the Education Commission 
of the states is elected versus appointed school boards.  Clearly the national 
pattern, in terms of both authority and accountability, is one of elected school 
boards.  There are a few remaining appointed school boards in South Carolina, an 
issue that should perhaps be revisited in those districts.  
 
The statistical analysis reveals that autonomous districts have slightly 
higher millage rates, but that the difference is relatively small.   The difference in 
operating millage is even smaller between autonomous and other districts.  There 
does seem to be some relationship between fiscal autonomy and tax rates, but it is 
neither strong in terms of statistical significance nor large in terms of total 
millage.  Interestingly, when districts are grouped so that districts with full 
autonomy are compared with all other districts, the millage difference remains but 
the effect of autonomy on the increase in millage disappears.  Districts with full 
autonomy have not been exercising that autonomy to increase mill rates faster 
than other districts in the last decade.   
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Once we move away from millage to other measures of school revenue 
and spending, such as local revenue per pupil or total revenue per pupil, fiscal 
autonomy becomes a relatively insignificant factor in explaining differences 
between districts.  Moving still farther from spending to performance, we could 
not detect any difference between student performance in districts with full, 
limited, or no fiscal autonomy; socio-demographic factors were of overwhelming 
significance in all cases. 
 
 
  Recommendations: 
 
 
Utilizing South Carolina specific data, this report finds little evidence that 
fiscal autonomy for school districts has resulted in unusual increases in local tax 
rates nor can it be tied to student performance.  It thus follows that the decision on 
this whether to extend fiscal autonomy to all districts must be based on 
considerations other than these two. 
 
Given these findings, the arguments for autonomy appear to be strong and 
rest on accountability and uniformity.   We recommend extending fiscal 
autonomy to all districts for the following reasons: 
 
1. The importance of uniformity in ability to respond to changing state 
requirements, funding or mandates. 
2. Such autonomy will match fund raising ability with the growing 
accountability facing all school boards. 
3. This would be consistent with "home rule".  School boards, like city 
and county councils, are elected and therefore accountable.  Full 
autonomy would give them the same degree of home rule now enjoyed 
by county and city councils. 
4. The fact that districts with full autonomy have not exercised that 
autonomy in the last ten years to raise mill rates faster than districts 
with limited or no autonomy. 
5. Other elected boards and councils that may have authority over a 
school's budget  are not always familiar with the school's budget. In 
districts where county council approval is required for budgets and/or 
millage increases, a body that has little day-to-day involvement in 
education has to second-guess or oversee those who have the 
responsibility, knowledge and training to manage school affairs.  A 
once a year look at school budgets does not develop that expertise in 
county council members, who are elected to deal with such very 
different matters as roads, jails, parks, property tax administration, and 
land use management. 
  
 
 25
 Arguments against autonomy include a concern over the coordination of 
decisions between multiple taxing bodies drawing on the same tax base.  This has 
at its core fears of tax increases or “the impact on total mill rate’ resulting from 
fiscal autonomy12 Further, to quote the State Chamber of Commerce: “federal and 
state funds available to schools are dramatically different than those available to 
local governments; therefore revenues and taxes available to all local entities need 
to be reviewed and monitored in detail.”13  This statement would appear to call for 
a complete review and revamping of local government financing before changing 
school funding policies. A final Chamber concern is their objection to expanding 
school revenue sources without being explicit about the taxes and their incidence. 
As noted above, the decision on granting school districts fiscal autonomy should 
exclude concerns over tax impact and student performance.  Thus, the first 
argument against autonomy reported in the preceding paragraph has been dealt 
with in this report.  Second, calling for a complete study and revamp of local tax 
structures and intergovernmental fiscal relations, while perhaps in order, seems a 
bit extreme for the topic at hand.  Finally, it is hard to understand the concern over 
the tax source (property taxes) and incidence (a much researched issue). 
 
Thus, given the results of this study and the weakness of the arguments 
against granting full autonomy for all elected school boards, the conclusion of this 
research is to favor such autonomy.  It is also recommended that every effort be 
made to assure that these school boards have the requisite skills and education to 
fulfill the responsibilities associated with this responsibility. It would appear, 
however, that the results of this study cast doubt over the viability of this concern. 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 See page 20 of The Local Government Funding System: A Report From the Technical Work Group to the 
Local Government Funding System Steering Committee. 
13 Ibid. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
Selected States and Fiscal Autonomy 
 
 
 
North Carolina   
 
There are 117 school districts in NC.  100 of the districts are county units, and 
there are 17 specially chartered city units.  County boards of education consist of 
five members who are elected every four years.  Two city systems, Mooresville 
and Roanoke Rapids, have charters which allow the local board of education to 
set a school tax rate.  The other 115 districts are fiscally dependent- they must rely 
on county commissioners for local funds. 
 
The county commissioners have final approval of local budgets.  The state, 
through the Local Government Commission (LGC) also reviews county and local 
school budgets.  Furthermore, the state has established a maximum tax rate of 
$1.50 per hundred-dollar valuation.  State law requires a balanced budget.  Voter 
approval of the budget is not required. 
 
Capital outlay is also the responsibility of local county commissioners.  General 
obligation bonds are the most common source for these funds.  Also, in 1983 and 
1986, local option sales taxes were established to support capital outlay needs.    
The North Carolina School Boards Association continues to advocate for the 
transfer of fiscal authority to local boards of education 
 
Georgia1 
 
Of the 180 school systems in Georgia (159 county systems and 21 city systems), 
only 11 must secure approval from another governmental entity for approval of 
their budgets and/or property tax millage rates. Ten city systems are dependent on 
city councils, while the boards of education in the other 11 cities have their own 
independent taxing authority. The recent trend has been toward more city school 
boards having their own taxing authority. There is only one county school system 
that must secure approval of the county commission for its tax rate. The charter 
that created the school system in that county was “grandfathered” because it pre-
dates the state constitution of 1877 
 
There are two types of school systems in Georgia. Every county is, by default, a 
countywide school system unless a municipal school system that operated prior to 
                                                          
1.        The description of Georgia school finance comes in large part from correspondence with 
Dr. Jeffrey Williams of the The Consortium of Education Research. 
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1945 has opted to continue to function as a separate system.  No new city systems 
have been permitted since 1945, and many city systems have ceased to operate 
since then. 
 
The Georgia Constitution permits local boards of education (or other taxing 
authorities in the 11 fiscally dependent systems) to levy 20 mills without having 
to secure voter approval. Only three county systems have obtained voter approval 
for millage rate caps higher than 20 mills; once a higher limit is approved, the 
new ceiling is permanent. The average millage rate for school operation is 
currently just over 14.5 mills. 
 
There are a few exceptions for the 20-mill limit provision in the state constitution. 
Four county systems originally had no limit on the number of mills that their 
boards could levy without needing voter approval in referenda. The Constitution 
permitted that status to be grandfathered in those systems, but local legislation has 
subsequently imposed a 20-mill cap in two of them, and only one is above 20 
mills at present. Additionally, the charters of two city systems (Atlanta and 
Decatur) provide for millage caps that exceed 20 mills and both of these cities are 
currently levying more than 20 mills. 
 
Local school districts fund capital outlay projects in one of two ways: (1) issue 
bonds or (2) levy a Special Purpose Local Option Sales Tax (SPLOST).  Local 
districts can not issue bonds in excess of 10% of the property value within the 
district.  A bond referendum must be approved by a simple majority of voters.  
The SPLOST is a one- percent sales tax for five years, which also requires voter 
approval.   
 
The Georgia School Boards Association (GSBA) supports retention of the current 
property taxing authority as the fundamental element in education finances. 
 
Tennessee 
 
There are 138 school districts in Tennessee.  124 of the districts (95 county and 29 
city) have no fiscal authority.  They have to rely on the county governing body to 
set the tax rate.  The remaining 14 are “special” school districts and are "fiscally 
independent."  Essentially, the boards of education of special districts may levy 
tax rates in addition to the county rate. Their independence is restricted by tax rate 
limits established in the acts that created the special district.  For tax rate increases 
beyond those limits established in the act that created the district, special school 
districts may petition to the state legislature.   
 
However, Dr. Harry Green of the Tennessee Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations says that it is difficult to accept that there are any 
“fiscally independent” school districts in Tennessee because the 14 special 
districts functioning under the additional tax rate can only recommend that a 
change in the rate be made by the General Assembly.  He states that it is “no 
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easier for them to get a rate change than any of the ‘dependent’ school systems. 
Local legislators who plan to seek re-election do not want to be tagged for a 
property tax increase. Hence, there is no ‘independence’. In fact, these 14 systems 
probably have a more difficult time getting a rate change than the ‘dependent’ 
system.”    Some of the 14 special districts have bonding authority through private 
acts.  These districts must seek General Assembly approval for any changes.   
 
Current Tennessee law prohibits the creation of any new special school districts, 
except for mergers or consolidation.  The Tennessee School Boards Association 
encourages the General Assembly to change the law to allow school systems to 
convert to special school districts so that they too may have limited fiscal 
authority. 
 
Texas2 
 
There are 1041 school districts in Texas.  Texas has two types of school districts: 
municipal school districts (MSD) and independent school districts (ISD).  Only 
two MSDs remain in Texas.  MSDs are no longer allowed in Texas (Senate Bill 1, 
1995), but MSDs in existence at the time the law changed can continue to operate 
under the laws applying to them prior to the law change.  
 
Most school districts are ISD’s.  Some are called “consolidated independent 
school districts” but the rules are the same.  The fiscal authority vested in ISD's is 
uniform throughout the state.  Fiscal authority is limited in various ways in these 
districts.  The main limitation is on tax rates.  There are two types of rates in 
Texas: a rate for maintenance and operations (M&O) and an interest and sinking 
fund rate (I&S).  All districts adopt M&O tax rates. All districts are limited to a 
$1.50 M&O tax rate (tax is levied per $100 of value, so a $1.50 tax on a $100,000 
home is $1,500). Limits were created many decades ago when school districts 
organized independently.  
 
When they asked the voters to permit them to be independent, they also asked the 
voters to approve a tax rate limit. Most districts took a $1.50 limit because that 
was the maximum permitted. (At the time, that was a tax rate no one ever thought 
could or would be reached.) A few districts approached voters with a lower limit. 
For example, I think Arlington ISD has a 1.30 tax rate limit. Efforts in the last 
decade seeking voter approval to raise the limit were unsuccessful.    
  
Texas school districts that have authorized long-term debt adopt an I&S rate.  
There is also a limit on the I&S rate of $0.50. Districts seeking authority (from the 
state) to sell bonds must assure the state that they have the revenue capacity to 
service the bonds at a rate at or below $0.50. Once authorization is given to a 
school district, it is possible for it to exceed $0.50 in I&S taxes IF that is required 
to service the bonds. This comes up rarely--but occurs in situations where a major 
                                                          
2.  Dr. Catherine Clark, Program Director for Research and Policy for the Charles A. Dana 
Center at the University of Texas at Austin. 
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property tax payer leaves or goes out of business--and the district has to hike the 
tax rate to get the needed revenue. A district in this situation will most likely 
restructure the debt, but that can take time and in the meantime, the tax rate may 
have to go up.   
 
There is also a wealth limitation on school districts through a recapture program.  
All school districts must maintain a wealth level of $295,000 per weighted 
student.  The 90+ districts above this level must shed that wealth through one of 
five options.  Most “buy” attendance credits from the state and thus leaves these 
districts with less money to spend.   
 
Another very important limitation on school boards in Texas is the rollback.  The 
rollback is a taxpayer relief mechanism that allows local voters to disregard the 
tax rate set by the school board.  A rollback election occurs when a school district 
attempts to increase the tax rate above a certain percentage.  The percentage 
changes each year, depending on where the legislature sets it -- usually from 3-
6%.  At the election, voters who vote "yes" say they want the higher rate. If the 
voters say "no" then the district is held at a tax rate just below the rollback 
threshold. In other words, rates can creep upward little by little without voter 
authorization.  
 
Texas also limits administrative costs.  Each district must keep administrative 
costs below a ratio determined by the commissioner of education.   
Districts have the power to provide optional homestead exemptions.  Texas does 
not require voter approval of the school budget.  Again, tax rate approval by the 
voters only occurs if the rollback limit is exceeded. 
 
Colorado 
 
Colorado school districts have little fiscal authority. The 176 local school districts 
in Colorado levy a tax (primarily through a property tax) for their share of funding 
based on the formula-determined equalized spending level. School districts may 
supplement this spending level, but only if local voters authorize them to do so. 
These are called "voter approved override mill levies." Voter approved override 
mill levies are limited to 20% of formula or $200,000, whichever is greater.   
Furthermore, school districts have a required minimum budget for capital outlay, 
insurance, and risk management. Additionally, school districts may fund capital 
expenditures through bonds or additional millage. Both of these options must be 
approved by voters.  If voters approve the additional mills for capital outlay, the 
amount is limited to 10 mills for not longer than 3 years. Total bonded 
indebtedness is limited to 20% of assessed valuation or 6% of actual valuation 
(except that for rapidly growing districts the 20% limit is increased to 25%). 
 
In sum, the districts are technically "fiscally independent," but the amount of 
revenue is largely state-determined with a small measure of local leeway through 
the voter override. The districts are able to set their own budgets.   
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In Standing Resolution 11, the Colorado Association of School Boards (CASB) 
“opposes efforts to shift control over public schools away from the local school 
board, whether by state or federal legislative action, regulation or court decision. 
CASB believes the principle of local control is derived from the involvement of 
the people and is the sole and final guarantor of educational quality.” 
 
 
Connecticut 
  
All 166 public school districts in Connecticut are coterminous with one or more 
units of local governments called “towns.”  Of the 166 districts, 149 districts are 
operated by a single town.  There are 17 regional, multi-town school districts.  
The 169 towns in Connecticut have the right to tax real and personal property.  
Thus, all school districts in Connecticut are fiscally dependent on the towns.  That 
is, they have no taxing authority.  The municipality’s legislative body (either the 
common council, town meeting, or the representative town meeting) must 
approve all local budgets.  Only the total budget can be reduced;  the budget 
cannot be revised item by item.  Therefore, the school board has full control of its 
budget within its total appropriation.  
 
There are no statutory limitations on the amount of property tax, which may be 
levied to fund education.  However, the amount of school bonds outstanding is 
limited to 4.5 times the town’s prior year total revenues.  There is also a cap on all 
bonds at 7.0 times total revenues. 
 
 
New York 
 
There are 682 school districts in New York.  Except for the school districts in the 
state’s five largest cities (New York City, Yonkers, Buffalo, Rochester, and 
Syracuse) all districts have independent taxing and borrowing authority.  The 
districts in the five largest cities have Constitutional limits that apply to the total 
municipal budget.   
 
The remaining school districts levy a property tax to fund education.  These 
school districts may also use some portion of the local county sales tax to support 
education.  There are no tax limits on these districts.  However, districts are 
limited in that school budgets are subject to referenda.  The state’s School Tax 
Relief Program (STAR) was designed to provide uniformity in school budget 
voting procedures.  School districts are limited to one vote and one revote on 
school budget referenda.  The program specifies a single statewide day to vote on 
school budgets.  Furthermore, school districts may not carry an unappropriated 
fund balance above 2% of their budget.   
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Minnesota 
 
Minnesota’s 350 school districts have limited fiscal authority.  Districts have 
fiscal independence, but are limited by the state's determination of the maximum 
levy for that district.  The state determines the maximum levy for each school 
district by funding category.  Formulas for computing the maximum levy for each 
funding category are specified in state law.  Districts may increase the amount 
levied for general education purposes through a referendum election.  A simple 
majority is required to approve an operating referendum. The referendum 
allowance per pupil is capped to the greater of the district's referendum allowance 
for 1993-1994 or 25% of the general education formula less $300.   
 
A school district may issue bonds for capital outlay when approved by voter 
referendum.  The districts may levy for the payment of principal and interest due 
on the bonds.  There are no local laws that further limit school district fiscal 
authority. 
 
Wisconsin3 
 
There are 426 school districts in Wisconsin.  369 of these are called "common 
school districts."  Common school districts are K-12.  47 districts are "unified 
school districts."  Unified school districts are K-8.  10 districts are grades 9-12 
and are called "union high school districts."  The school district serving 
Milwaukee is called a "first class district."   
 
Common and union high school districts have fiscal independence, but are limited 
by the requirement of an annual meeting of voters to approve the district's levy.  
Districts do retain the authority to adjust the tax levy if the amount approved at 
the annual meeting is insufficient.  The annual meeting requirement provides the 
levy necessary to operate the district.  However, the annual meeting requirement 
has become less significant since Wisconsin's legislature imposed revenue limits 
beginning on 1993.  Under the revenue limits, the annual increase in a school 
district's per pupil revenue derived from general school aids, computer aid and 
property taxes is restricted.  In general, the allowable increase in revenue per 
pupil cannot exceed $220.29 in 2000-01, which is adjusted annually for inflation.  
A school district can exceed the revenue limit by receiving voter approval at a 
referendum.  The school board must approve a resolution supporting inclusion in 
the school district budget an amount that exceeds the revenue limit.  The 
resolution must specify whether the proposed excess revenue is for a recurring or 
nonrecurring purpose, or both. The school board can either call a special 
referendum or hold the referendum at the regular primary or general election.  If 
the resolution is approved by a majority of those voting on the question, the 
school board can exceed the limit by the approved amount. 
                                                          
3. Dr. Thomas Johnson of the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction. 
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Unified and first class districts have no annual meeting requirement, but are 
subject to the revenue limits.   
 
Wisconsin school districts have significant fiscal authority in regards to school 
borrowing.  All districts have the authority to borrow up to $1.0 million without 
voter approval.  If the district intends to issue a promissory note in excess of  $1.0 
million, then a referendum is required only if a petition is signed by 7,500 voters 
or 20% of the voters, whichever is less.  If the district intends to issue a municipal 
bond, then the board may either: (1) call for a referendum; (2) hold a public 
hearing at which the voters present decide whether a referendum should be held; 
or (3) expose the bond issuance to a petition for referendum (subject to the same 
requirements as for a promissory note).   
 
Iowa 
 
The 375 school districts in Iowa have limited fiscal autonomy.  Each district has a 
maximum spending cap set by a formula in the statute.  If the revenues available 
to the district under the state’s foundation plan do not equal the formula 
determined amount, then the district may levy for cash reserve to replace the 
shortage.   
 
Though property taxes are the primary source of revenue in Iowa school districts, 
districts also have the option of using an income surtax.  The maximum surtax 
rate is 20%.  District may levy the surtax to fund: (1) instructional support 
programs, (2) physical plant and equipment levies, (3) asbestos removal, and (4) 
educational improvement.  In the 1998-99 school year, 208 of the 375 districts 
(55%) used the income surtax as a partial source of revenue for instructional 
support.   
 
Other than the cap on districts’ budgets, limits are also placed on districts on a 
levy by levy basis depending on the purpose of the levy.  However, the general 
funding of districts (which is set by the formula) is not subject to voter approval.  
Districts may appeal their budget to the state Board of Appeal.  Also, any district 
that overspends its budget must appear before the state School Budget Review 
Committee with a corrective action plan.       
 
Nevada 
 
The 17 school districts in Nevada have limited fiscal authority.  Districts are 
required to levy $0.75 per $100 of assessed valuation property tax for operations.  
Local school districts do not have statutory authority to levy additional taxes to 
supplement the state program.  The maximum local aggregate tax rate is limited 
by the state Constitution as well as by statute.  There are no state imposed 
spending limits other than the requirement of a balanced budget.  Voters do not 
have to approve school districts’ budgets.  Budgets are approved by a majority 
vote of the school board after the requirements of a timely public notice and 
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hearing are met.  The issuance of bonds for capital outlay requires a simple 
majority vote in a referendum of the registered voters. 
 
California 
 
Control of school finance has shifted away from the 988 local districts to the state 
in recent years.  Local property taxes are directly controlled by the state.  These 
taxes are limited by the state Constitution to 1% of the assessed value.  Districts 
may levy taxes for general obligation bonds if approved by a two-thirds 
supermajority of the registered voters.   
 
The California School Board Association supports equitable local tax levying 
authority for local school boards and a simple majority requirement for all school 
tax and bond elections (from 2001-2002 Policy Platform).   
 
School District Finance Survey 
 
The School District Finance Survey (also known as the F33 survey) includes a 
factor that indicates whether a school district is “independent” or “dependent.”  
The Census Bureau compiles the study.  The data collection takes place every five 
years for years ending in 2 and 7.  The criteria used by the Census to determine 
whether a district is “independent” is described in the Census Bureau publication 
“Governments Organizations, 1997.” For a general definition of school districts 
and also for descriptions by state, please see Appendix A of that publication.  
 
According to “Governments Organizations, 1997,” a school district is 
“independent” if it possesses substantial autonomy.  A school district is 
substantially autonomous “where subject to statutory limitations and any 
supervision of local governments by the state, an entity has considerable fiscal 
and administrative independence.”  Fiscally “independent” does not mean 
“autonomous.”  Fiscal independence generally means the entity has the power to 
determine its budget without review and significant modification by another local 
entity or official.  Fiscal independence also entails the power to levy taxes and 
issue debt without review by another local government.  In ambiguous 
circumstances, the Census Bureau also takes account of local attitudes as to 
whether the entity is independent and the effect of the classification on collection 
and presentation of statistics of governmental finances.   
 
Table 1 of Appendix A provides the independent and dependent local education 
agencies by state.14  
 
 
                                                          
14 Tables compiled by Mark Gladner of the National Education Data Resource Center. 
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    Appendix A    Table 1 
 
STATE Dependent Independent State Grand Total 
Alabama            127            127 
Alaska             34          19             53 
Arizona               6            222            228 
Arkansas            326            326 
California             57            993         1,050 
Colorado            194            194 
Connecticut           149             24            173 
Delaware             19             19 
District of Columbia               1               1 
Florida             67             67 
Georgia            180            180 
Hawaii            1               1 
Idaho            112            112 
Illinois         1,003         1,003 
Indiana            315            315 
Iowa            394            394 
Kansas            304            304 
Kentucky            176            176 
Louisiana             66             66 
Maine           194             98            292 
Maryland             24             24 
Massachusetts           354             82            436 
Michigan            623          68            691 
Minnesota            407            407 
Mississippi               4            149            153 
Missouri            525            525 
Montana            490            490 
Nebraska            674            674 
Nevada             17             17 
New Hampshire             10            167            177 
New Jersey             53            558            3            614 
New Mexico             89             89 
New York               5            701            706 
North Carolina           117            117 
North Dakota            263            263 
Ohio            731            731 
Oklahoma            549            549 
Oregon            225            225 
Pennsylvania            596            596 
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STATE Dependent Independent State Grand Total 
 
 
Rhode Island             31               4            1             36 
South Carolina             91             91 
South Dakota            177            177 
Tennessee           125             14            139 
Texas         1,043         1,043 
Utah             40             40 
Vermont            326            326 
Virginia           134             20            154 
Washington            305            305 
West Virginia             55             55 
Wisconsin               3            426            429 
Wyoming             49             49 
Grand Total         1,301       14,016          92       15,409 
 
 
